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According to the Predicate Theory of names (PT), proper names ‘are predicates’, in 
the sense of displaying a behavior parallel to that of ‘general terms which, together 
with a copula ... are parsed as predicates in formal semantical theory’ (Burge 1973: 
428-9). According to a particular version of PT, the Metalinguistic Theory (MT), 
names should be interpreted as predicates of a particular sort, namely as 
metalinguistically oriented expressions involving ‘the name itself’. 
The evidence provided in support of PT and MT, having to do with determiner-
name pairs, morphologically inflected names, or naming constructions, is in turn 
alleged to entail a descriptivist treatment of names in designative position, such as 
‘Kennedy’ in  
(1) Kennedy was shot in Dallas.  
Accordingly, PT and MT are customarily presented as novel contributions to one of 
the fundamental debates in philosophical semantics—in particular, as challenges to 
theories of names as ‘directly referring rigid designators’ (Matushansky 2008: 573-4). 
The main aim of this essay is that of questioning the significance of PT and MT 
as theories of designation: even granting for the argument’s sake that names are 
analyzable as (metalinguistic) predicates, their designative occurrences may be 
interpreted in consonance with the dictates of Direct Reference—indeed, in 
consonance with the radically anti-descriptivist version of Direct Reference I call 
Millianism. Accordingly, after a few preliminary remarks in section one, in section 
two I propose an analysis of (1) consistent with PT and MT, but also committed to the 
notion that (1) is associated with a singular proposition, as Direct Reference 
demands. In section three, I flank this proposal with an analysis that achieves that 
singular proposition by appealing to a constant character for ‘Kennedy’, as required 
by Millianism. 
For simplicity’s sake, sections two and three explicitly leave issues of 
homonymy on the side. Since these issues are of some relevance for my topic, I 
proceed to a discussion of homonymy in section four, where I contrast an ambiguity 
approach with what I call ‘context-sensitivity’ treatments. I conclude this essay in 
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section five, where I develop the suggestions from sections two and three with 
homonymy in the spotlight, and where I amend my Direct Reference and (especially) 
Millian takes on PT/MT accordingly. 
 
 
1. PT and MT: Preliminaries 
Consider the occurrence of ‘Kennedy’ in  
(2) there is a Kennedy in the house 
 the Kennedy I know speaks French 
 at least two Kennedys have been Catholic.1 
According to PT, (2) is evidence that ‘Kennedy’ is syntactically predicative, on a par 
with, say, ‘(is a) cat’ (compare with ‘there is a cat in the house’, ‘the cat I know 
speaks French’, and ‘at least two cats have been Catholic’).2 Writing ‘kennedy’ as a 
graphically perspicuous rendering of the predicate in question, the sentences in (2) are 
then analyzable as 
(2a) there is a kennedy in the house 
the kennedy I know speaks French 
at least two kennedys have been Catholic. 
This parallelism is notoriously far from exceptionless, given that names at least 
superficially tolerate the absence of a determiner, as in the example cited above and 
repeated here: 
(1) Kennedy was shot in Dallas  
(contrast with *‘cat was shot in Dallas’). Since ‘Kennedy’ prima facie occurs 
predicatively in (2) but not in (1), an account of its seemingly dual behavior is 
imperative. Uncontroversially, the contrast cannot be dismissed as an accidental 
lexical ambiguity for ‘Kennedy’, and must be explainable in terms of systematic 
mechanisms applicable to names across the board. PT’s solution in this respect 
invokes an unpronounced determiner, as in 
(1a) det kennedy was shot in Dallas 
for some determiner det yet to be discussed.  
When it comes to ‘kennedy’, the predicate involved in the analysans for (1) and 
(2), an appeal to uniformity and pre-theoretic intuition typically motivates a popular 
development of PT, the Metalinguistic Theory of names (MT). The reasoning leading 
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from PT to MT takes as its starting point the information presumably conveyed by 
(2), roughly paraphraseable as 
(2b) there is an individual named ‘Kennedy’ in the house 
the individual named ‘Kennedy’ whom I know speaks French 
at least two individuals named ‘Kennedy’ have been Catholic.3 
On the basis of this evidence, ‘kennedy’, the predicate allegedly corresponding to the 
occurrences of ‘Kennedy’ in (2), is interpreted along metalinguistic lines, as in 
‘(individual) named ‘Kennedy’’. As a result, by uniformity, (1) is analyzed as 
(1b) det named ‘Kennedy’ was shot in Dallas, 
where a metalinguistically oriented predicate is flanked by the aforementioned 
unvoiced determiner det.4 
Intuitively, (1) has to do with a particular individual, at least partly in virtue of 
the occurrence of a name in that sentence—in some vague sense of ‘having to do’ yet 
to be clarified, and postponing until section four the discussion of scenarios in which 
many individuals ‘share the same name’. Striving for a neutral terminology, I describe 
the relationships between that individual and the occurrence of ‘Kennedy’ in (1) in 
terms of designation. As long as (1a) and (1b) are assumed to provide a semantically 
perspicuous analysis of (1), it follows that PT and MT entail a certain explanation of 
the designation-relation—one which appeals to the semantic properties of the 
determiner-phrases ‘det kennedy’ and ‘det named ‘Kennedy’’ occurring in the 
analysans.  
The aim of the next two sections is that of exploring PT’s and MT’s 
commitments as theories of designation. For the sake of concision, I develop my 
considerations with an explicit focus on MT, but my conclusions are applicable 
mutatis mutandis to alternative versions of PT. 
 
 
2. MT and Direct Reference 
What then are the characteristic tenets of the theory of designation stemming from 
MT? MT partisans typically gesture towards descriptivist viewpoints as congenial to 
their approach, and they cite positions from the Direct Reference camp as their 
polemical targets. Given the popularity of anti-descriptivist theories of designation 
committed to Direct Reference, conclusions of this sort would indeed make MT a 
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surprising addition to a long-standing debate in philosophical semantics.5 
Direct Reference appeals to the theoretical framework of propositional 
semantics, according to which a sentence S is associated (at a context c) with a 
structured proposition, in turn representable (given appropriate conventions) as an n-
tuple containing the contents (at c) appropriate for the components of S. For instance, 
given a simple sentence S of the form Fa, the proposition associated with S at c is 
representable as the pair 
(3) <{a}c, {F}c> 
where, as usual, {e} is the character of e (a function from contexts to contents), and 
{e}c is its content at c.6 
According to the Direct Reference view of names, (1) is associated with a 
singular proposition: the propositional constituent for which ‘Kennedy’ is responsible 
‘is just the object itself’ (Kaplan 1977: 494). As in 
(4) <i, shot> 
where i is an individual, and shot is the content of ‘was shot in Dallas’—hereinafter, 
ignoring a variety of tangential complications, simply the property of having been 
shot in Dallas, in turn understood as a function from circumstances to sets of 
individuals.7 This proposition is evaluated as true with respect to any circumstance w 
iff i bears shot at w, in consonance with the familiar rigid behavior presumably 
displayed by proper names. 
According to MT, (1) is analyzable as (1b), an expression involving a 
metalinguistic predicate flanked by det. If MT is at all of relevance for the debate on 
the semantics of proper names, it must be the case that the proposition associated with 
(1) (at c) is roughly of the form 
(5) <{det named ‘Kennedy’}c, shot> 
where {det named ‘Kennedy’}c is the content (at c) of the determiner-phrase invoked 
by MT, and shot is as before. The question of the relationships between MT and 
Direct Reference may thus be settled by addressing the extent to which an approach to 
det is available, which recognizes (5) as a singular proposition of the kind depicted in 
(4).8 
Clearly, those of an independent descriptivist persuasion may wish to pursue 
strategies responsible for outcomes of general (non-singular) propositions, opting for 
instance in favor of a treatment of det on the model of (certain views of) attributive 
uses of the English determiner ‘the’. Still, none of the evidence allegedly supporting 
5 
 
MT prevents an approach in the spirit of Direct Reference. In particular, let det be 
interpreted as dets (‘s’ mnemonic for ‘singular’), defined as follows: for any predicate 
F, 
(Dets)  {dets F}c = the unique i such that i ∈ {F}c (cw) 
where cw is the circumstance (possible world) determined by c.9  
Then (temporarily leaving aside the complications arising from homonymy 
scenarios, see sections four and five), the content of ‘dets named ‘Kennedy’’ at c is 
the individual i who bears the property {named ‘Kennedy’}c at cw, that is, the 
individual i who is named ‘Kennedy’ at cw.10 As a result, (1) ends up being associated 
(at c) with a singular proposition as in (4), with i the aforementioned individual. This 
singular proposition is, as usual, true at a circumstance w iff i bears shot at w, that is, 
iff the individual named ‘Kennedy’ at cw was shot in Dallas at w, consistently with the 
sort of de jure rigidity outcomes ensuing from Direct Reference. 11 
Of course, whether Direct Reference is at all an unassailable requirement, and, as 
a consequence, whether (Dets) is an independently motivated development of MT, 
remain issues that need to be addressed in their own right.12 But this diatribe is 
orthogonal to the predicative theory of names: if names in designative positions do 
indeed engender general propositions (and, perhaps as a result, behave flaccidly), so 
much the worse for any theory committed to Direct Reference (and/or rigidity), 
independently of the evidence provided by their presumed predicative occurrences. 
As I argue in the next section, a parallel strategy is available for a radically anti-
descriptivist take on names, the version of the singular-proposition approach I call 
Millianism. 
 
 
3. MT and Millianism 
According to the Direct Reference twist on MT in (Dets), the occurrence of ‘Kennedy’ 
in (1) contributes an individual i at exactly those contexts c such that i is named 
‘Kennedy’ at cw. In this sense, ‘Kennedy’ in (1) (analyzed as ‘dets named ‘Kennedy’’) 
is associated with a character f such that, for any c, f(c) is the individual named 
‘Kennedy’ at cw. 
Given certain obvious assumptions regarding who is named what, it follows that, 
according to (Dets), the occurrence of ‘Kennedy’ in (1) is associated with a non-
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constant character: given different contexts, it designates different individuals, 
depending on who is named ‘Kennedy’ at their circumstances.13 For this reason, 
(Dets) remains incompatible with Millianism, the view (at least in my sense of 
‘Millianism’) according to which ‘Kennedy’ in (1) is endowed with a constant 
character—the function that determines a particular individual as its content at any c. 
Could it then be that, notwithstanding the predicativists’ gesticulations against all 
versions of Direct Reference, it is in fact Millianism that provides the true polemical 
target for MT? Here as before, the answer must be negative, as long as the predicative 
approach furthered by MT may be rendered compatible with the Millian theory of 
names.  
Informally speaking, a determiner-phrase ‘det F’ may be endowed with a 
constant character only as long as the interpretation of F is prevented from identifying 
different individuals at distinct contexts. A particularly promising strategy for 
securing a result of this sort consists in ‘fixing’ a selected context as the parameter 
with respect to which {F} determines its content ‘once and for all’, as in the following 
interpretation of ‘det’ as ‘detm’ (‘m’ mnemonic for ‘Millian’): for any predicate F and 
context k,  
(Detm) {detm F, k} = the function f such that, for any c, f(c) = the unique i such that i 
∈ {F}k (kw) 
where as usual kw is the circumstance determined by k. In plainer English: given a 
context k, a determiner-phrase detm F is associated with a constant character, the 
function which, for any context c as its argument, yields the unique individual in the 
extension of F at k’s circumstances (as before, continuing to postpone issues of 
homonymy). In the case of the determiner-phrase of interest here: with respect to k, 
‘detm named ‘Kennedy’’ is associated with the constant character inevitably yielding 
whoever happens to be named ‘Kennedy’ at kw. As a result, the MT analysans of (1), 
now 
(6) detm named ‘Kennedy’ was shot in Dallas, 
is again associated (at c) with the singular proposition <i, shot> (see (4) in section 
two), where i is the individual named ‘Kennedy’ at kw. And, as before, this 
proposition turns out to be true with respect to any circumstance w as long as i was 
shot in Dallas at w. The resulting analysis thus achieves rigidity, singularity, and non-
indexicality: just as rabidly anti-descriptivist Millians demand.14 
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Of course, (Detm) achieves Millian results on the assumption of a fundamental 
modification of the classic semantic apparatus I have adopted thus far. In particular, 
(Detm) appeals to a double-context treatment, according to which what is endowed 
with a character is not a lone expression e, as in customary double-index treatments, 
but an expression-context pair <e, k>. As a result, in the framework invoked by 
(Detm), the content for an expression e at a context c may be established only with 
respect to a further particular context k, as in {e, k}c. For ease of exposition, I refer to 
the context in the position of k as a dubbing context and I label contexts in the role of 
c as interpreting contexts. As in: given a dubbing context k, the content of e at an 
interpreting context c is the value of the character {e, k} with c as its argument. 
Admittedly, given the non-orthodox approach sketched above, the Millian 
outcomes achieved by (Detm) may initially appear to depend on the ad hoc 
assumption of a mere formal trickery, deprived of independent philosophical interest 
and intuitive motivation. This suspicion is however unjustified: as I explain in section 
five, the double context apparatus operative in (Detm), and the associated distinction 
between dubbing and interpreting roles for context, provide natural developments of 
certain general (as some would put it, ‘metasemantic’) considerations that often 
accompany the Millian semantics for names. Still, the impetus for these 
considerations derives mainly from issues pertaining to so-called generic names—as 
in the pre-theoretic notion that, say, John Fitzgerald and Robert bear ‘one and the 
same (last) name’, ‘Kennedy’. It is thus imperative that I come to grips with the 
phenomenon of homonymy, thus far explicitly left aside in order to simplify the initial 
steps of my presentation. Accordingly, after some comments on the relationships 
between homonymy and MT in the next section, in section five I return to (Dets) and 
especially (Detm), this time with the possibility of homonymy firmly in the spotlight.15 
 
 
4. His Name is My Name Too 
Consider the contrast between (1) and its negation, that is, between the following two 
sentences: 
(6) Kennedy was shot in Dallas 
 Kennedy was not shot in Dallas. 
Clearly, utterances of these sentences can both be true if, to put it in the vernacular, 
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the former is ‘about’ John Fitzgerald, but the latter is ‘about’ his brother Robert.  
Both classic referentialism and any version of the predicate theory of names owe 
an explanation of this predicament. A simple strategy popular among referentialists 
involves an appeal to ambiguity, roughly on the model provided by true utterances of 
‘Jones went to the bank’ and ‘Jones did not go to the bank’ aimed at describing Jones’ 
movements towards financial institutions and embankments. According to this 
approach, then, the aforementioned utterances require distinct ‘disambiguations’ of 
superficially indistinguishable occurrences of ‘Kennedy’, roughly as in 
(7) Kennedy1 was shot in Dallas 
 Kennedy2 was not shot in Dallas, 
in turn accompanied by appropriate interpretations of the newly introduced artificial 
lexical items. 
No obvious development of this ambiguity approach to homonymy seems to be 
consonant with MT. According to MT, the constructs in (7) would have to be 
analyzed along the lines of, respectively, 
(8) (det named ‘Kennedy’)1 was shot in Dallas 
(det named ‘Kennedy’)2 was not shot in Dallas. 
Furthermore, since the dual semantic behavior of these determiner-phrases cannot 
plausibly be attributed to an ambiguity in det, appropriate disambiguation strategies 
would have to be mobilized for the predicate, as in 
(9) det (named ‘Kennedy’)1 was shot in Dallas 
 det (named ‘Kennedy’)2 was not shot in Dallas. 
Yet, a result of this kind would prove problematic when it comes to the evidence that 
provides the very impetus for predicativism, having to do with cases such as (2). For, 
according to the ambiguity view, the religious alliances of John Fitzgerald and Robert 
would no more justify the conclusion that, say, 
(10) at least two Kennedys were Catholic 
than the presence in my room of a hitting device and a certain flying mammal could 
provide the conditions for a true utterance of ‘there are two bats in my room’.16 
Indeed, according to MT, cases such as (10) are analyzed as 
(11) at least two individuals named ‘Kennedy’ were Catholic, 
and are thus actually true only if more than one individual may satisfy the condition 
of being named ‘Kennedy’ at our world. In this sense, the property provided by 
‘named n’ (at c) must be understood in such a way that distinct individuals i and j may 
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both belong in the extension it determines with respect to a given circumstance. If, by 
uniformity, a property of this sort is of relevance for the determiner-phrases involved 
in the analysis of the sentences in (6), it follows that utterances of these sentences 
may be interpreted correctly only if suitably different restrictions are imposed on the 
named-‘Kennedy’ condition—pre-theoretically speaking, restrictions that secure John 
Fitzgerald in one case, and Robert in the other. In semantic terms, this idea 
corresponds to the notion that the determiner-phrases occurring in the MT analyses of 
(6) must be evaluated with respect to distinct parameters. A natural option in this 
respect, one of particular interests due to its repercussions when it comes to (Dets) and 
(Detm), identifies the parameters in question as elements of context—say, as dedicated 
co-ordinates cn, informally c’s ‘naming convention’.  
The idea of a ‘naming convention’ notoriously deserves independent study.17 
Still, from this essay’s viewpoint, the details pertaining to the sort of linguistic and 
extra-linguistic regularities eventually formalizable in terms of cn may safely be left 
aside. For concreteness’ sake, I proceed without further ado with an understanding of 
cn as a ‘disambiguating’ restriction—say, a function such that, for any name n and 
circumstance w, |cn (named n (w))| = 1, where named n (w) is the set of individuals 
who are named n at w. 18  So, informally, John Fitzgerald is the unique actual 
individual who is named ‘Kennedy’ according to a certain naming convention f1, and 
Robert is the unique actual individual who is named ‘Kennedy’ according to a distinct 
naming convention f2. 
According to this context-sensitive alternative to the ambiguity view, then, the 
aforementioned utterances of the sentences in (6) are understood as occurrences of 
one and the same expression on different occasions—in particular, on occasions 
representable by contexts which differ with respect to their naming-convention 
parameters. I devote the next section to the exploration of how this sort of context-
sensitivity may be reflected at the level of semantic analysis, with particular attention 
to its relationships with the treatments of det introduced in sections two and three. In 
particular, after a few comments on the indexicalist take that naturally accompanies 
(Dets), I pause on an account of context-sensitivity consonant with the double-context 
paradigm developed for (Detm), indirectly making good on my pledge to explain its 
independent philosophical motivation. 
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5. Homonymy, Direct Reference, and Millianism 
Given the standard semantic treatment adopted in section two (as opposed to the 
unorthodox double-context framework from section three), the notion that certain 
expressions are context-sensitive is immediately translatable in terms of non-constant 
characters. In this framework, then, the determiner-phrase which MT associates with 
the occurrence of ‘Kennedy’ in (1) may designate different individuals at different 
contexts—in particular, at contexts that differ for their naming-convention. 19 
Here as in section two, this option may be developed along straightforwardly 
descriptivist lines, but may also be approached from a viewpoint sympathetic to 
Direct Reference, as in the following development of (Dets): 
(Det*s)  {dets F}c = the unique i such that i ∈ (cn) ({F}c (cw)) 
So, given a context c, {dets named ‘Kennedy’}c is the unique individual selected by cn 
among those who are named ‘Kennedy’ at cw. Note that, according to (Det*s), dets-
phrases are endowed with a non-constant character ‘over and above’ the sense 
appropriate for (Dets). Clause (Dets), developed under the temporary assumption of 
lack of homonymies, recognizes semantic variations only when it comes to contexts c  
that differ with respect to their privileged circumstances cw. (Det*s), on the other 
hand, also allows for a distinction among individuals who bear a certain name at one 
unique circumstance, depending on the details in cn.  
Since Millianism is incompatible with the assignment of non-constant characters 
to proper names, a Millian understanding of the context-sensitivity approach to 
homonymy inevitably needs to limit the role of cn to the sort of effects achieved by 
‘dubbing contexts’ within the double-context apparatus from section three. As in: 
(Det*m) {detm F, k} = the function f such that, for any c, f(c) = the unique i such 
that i ∈ (kn) ({F}k (kw)). 
So, given a dubbing context k, (Det*m) sanctions that the character for ‘detm named 
‘Kennedy’’, when applied to an interpreting context c, yields a certain unique 
individual, the individual selected by k’s naming convention among those who are 
named ‘Kennedy’ at kw. 
It is at this stage that the two-context apparatus I invoked in section three may 
hopefully be understood as more than philosophically unmotivated formal hocus-
pocus. Recall to begin with the sort of warning common in informal discussions of 
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designation, variously phrased as the intimation that designating is not the business of 
a name simpliciter, but rather of a use of that name on a certain occasion, an 
occurrence of it in a particular speaker’s mouth, or something of that sort. According 
to a viewpoint often associated with the Direct Reference movement, these allusions 
to ‘uses’ or ‘occurrences’ may profitably be modulated in the spirit of the so-called 
Causal (a.k.a. Historical) Picture of names: an utterance of ‘Kennedy’ on a particular 
occasion designates John Fitzgerald, rather than Robert or anybody else, by virtue of 
bearing a suitable relation to a dubbing episode involving that man—on a particularly 
simple version of the Causal Picture, by virtue of occurring as a link within a 
designation-preserving chain originating with his baptism.20 
At least from the viewpoint of the theory of designation, it is natural to develop 
these hints in terms of a certain conception of the proper input for semantic 
evaluation: not generic name-types, such as the seven-letter expression ‘Kennedy’, 
but items of a more fine-grained nature, such as an occurrence of ‘Kennedy’ as a 
name for John Fitzgerald.21 Since the normal process of everyday communication 
ostensibly involves tokens of ‘Kennedy’, the name-type, these suggestions typically 
end up promoting some sort of division of labor between properly semantic and so-
called pre-semantic considerations. As in (roughly):  given your position within a 
network of name-transmission practices originating with i, the occurrence of 
‘Kennedy’ in your mouth is interpretable in consonance with the properties associated 
by an adequate semantic theory with expressions devoted to designating i, rather than 
anybody else.22 
The picture sketched in the foregoing paragraphs is admittedly rough and in dire 
need of development. Still, the point here is not the discussion of the relationships 
between pre-semantic and properly semantic questions, given viewpoints suitable for 
a theory of designation. After all, if the predicativist evidence summarized in section 
one is on the right track, designation does not exhaust a name’s genuinely semantic 
behavior: proper names, so the story goes, are also employable in non-designative 
roles, as in (2). Since these example are presumably worthy of semantic 
consideration, it follows that the faith of generic name-types, such as the common 
appellation for John Fitzgerald and Robert, may not be relegated to the pre-semantic 
limbo. As a result, it follows that the distinction between ‘Kennedy’ as a name for 
John Fitzgerald and ‘Kennedy’ as a name for Robert must be the responsibility of 
some parameter ‘internal’ to the semantic machinery put in motion for their 
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interpretation. 
Given the Millian notion that proper names are endowed with a constant 
character, the idea of a semantic parameter responsible for the distinction between 
different uses of ‘Kennedy’ must inevitably end up with the recognition that context 
plays a role over and above (figuratively, ‘before’) its ability to serve as argument for 
character—indeed, a role responsible for the assignment of a character to a name-
type, as it is being used on a particular occasion. What a Millian theory concerned 
solely with the details of the designation relation could afford to relegate to pre-
semantic context is thus now naturally recognized as a distinct semantic function for 
context, one naturally formalizable in terms of the distinction between dubbing 
contexts and interpreting contexts, as suggested in section three.23 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
The main aim of this essay has been that of arguing that PT and MT do not provide 
momentous evidence in favor of this or that theory of designation—even under the 
assumption of PT/MT’s (possibly controversial) appeals to intuition and uniformity. 
In sections two and three, I defended this conclusion by suggesting developments of 
PT and MT consistent with eminently non-descriptivist viewpoints, such as Direct 
Reference and Millianism. Sections four and five pursued these approaches not only 
from the viewpoint of a theory of designation, but also from perspectives directly 
interested in generic names, as in cases of homonymy. The resulting semantic 
standpoints indirectly explain how non-designative occurrences of proper names, such 
as ‘Kennedy’ in (2), may be explained without relinquishing anti-descriptivist 
explanations of designation. In particular, the (presumed) evidence favoring an 
account of names ‘as predicates’ may peacefully co-exist with Direct Reference and 
Millian accounts of det, the determiner allegedly at work in designative occurrences,  
as in (Det*s) and (Det*m) from section five. 
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1 As for the inflection in the last sentence in (2), note that the analogy between names 
and common nouns is far from perfect. For one thing, the preferred plural for 
‘Kennedy’ is ‘Kennedys’, not ‘Kennedies’. For another, the plural form is arguably 
optional: both ‘there are two Marys in my class’ and ‘there are two Mary in my class’ 
are acceptable, but ‘there are two cat in my class’ is not. 
2  Further considerations in favour of PT stem from the syntax of naming 
constructions, as in Matushansky’s analysis in terms of small clauses (Matushansky 
2008; for different considerations regarding naming constructions, see also Fara 
2011).  
3 The inevitability of metalinguistic paraphrases has been challenged by Boer and 
Jeshion (Boer 1975, Jeshion 2013a, 2013b, and 2013c), who present an impressive 
variety of examples arguably parallel to (2), but which do not elicit metalinguistic 
interpretations. 
4 For careful critical discussions of this appeal to uniformity see in particular Jeshion 
2013a and 2013b, Leckie 2013, and Rami 2013. As announced, I leave these worries 
aside (and those of the sort mentioned in the preceding footnote) merely for the 
argument’s sake. 
Many details in (1b) are worthy of independent study. Defenders of MT devote a 
great deal of attention to the relation mentioned in (1b), occasionally distinguishing 
between ‘being named’, ‘bearing a name’, and ‘being called’ (see Matushansky 2008, 
Fara 2011 and, from neighbouring metalinguistic descriptivist camps, Bach 2002 and 
Geurts 1997). To my knowledge, remarkably less effort is devoted to the study of that 
relation’s second relatum, the quotational expression. Yet, none of these 
complications are of immediate importance here, my considerations being 
rephraseable according to any reasonable understanding of ‘being named’ and of 
mentioning devices. 
5 The most explicit statements in this respect come from Matushansky, according to 
whom PT/MT supports a descriptivist stance, in some wide sense of descriptivism 
supposed to include Frege 1892, Russell 1911, Searle 1958, Kneale 1962, Burge 
1973, Katz 1977, 1990, 1994, and Bach 1981, 1987, 2002 (Matushansky 2008: 573-
4).  
6 The notation and terminology are borrowed from Kaplan 1977. For developments, 
see Salmon 1986 and Soames 1987;  for general philosophical comments, see also 
King 2007. 
7 In the sense of ‘circumstance’ from Kaplan 1977, hereinafter for simplicity’s sake 
merely possible worlds. So, leaving aside issues of tense and pretty much any other 
detail ensuing from the internal composition of this verb-phrase, {was shot in Dallas}c 
(w) is the set of individuals who bear shot at w. 
8 The (simplified) propositional structure presented in (5) is obviously inspired by the 
classic treatment informally put forth by Kaplan (Kaplan 1977 and 1989). Strictly 
speaking, some independently important details in this respect are however in contrast 
with the spirit of Kaplan’s own version of propositional semantics—in particular 
when it comes to the treatment of what he would presumably consider a ‘syntactically 
complex’ expression such as ‘det named ‘Kennedy’’ (see in particular Kaplan 1977: 
494 and especially the discussion of ‘dthat’ in Kaplan 1989: 580-2 and the related 
distinction between ‘logical syntax’ and ‘semantic form’). Still, considerations of this 
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sort may safely be left aside when it comes to the diatribe addressed in this essay. 
9 See Kaplan 1977 and Lewis 1980. Throughout this essay, I leave aside questions of 
‘emptiness’, thereby eschewing ‘if any’ caveats; as for uniqueness, see the 
considerations later in this essay.  
10 If the present tense in ‘(is an individual) named ‘Kennedy’’ is treated according to a 
simple-minded indexical model, {named ‘Kennedy’}c is the property of being named 
‘Kennedy’ at ct, the context’s time, so that {named ‘Kennedy’}c(cw) is the set of 
individuals who are named ‘Kennedy’ at ct and cw. Issues of tense and temporal 
dependence are ignored throughout this essay—the point of this footnote being rather 
than of stressing the two-fold role of c in the identification of {F}c(cw), first as a 
parameter for the interpretation of indexicality, then as a co-ordinate relevant from the 
viewpoint of contingency (see Kaplan 1977 and Lewis 1980). 
11 The strategy in (Dets) is reminiscent of Kaplan conception of ‘dthat’ as a device of 
direct reference, see Kaplan 1977 and 1989. These similarities are particularly 
intriguing if approached from the viewpoint of certain Kaplan-inspired views of 
complex demonstratives, according to which the material flanking ‘that’ 
compositionally determines the character of ‘that F’ (see Borg 2000 and Salmon 
2002). A suggestion of this sort inevitably brings to mind what is generally cited as 
the original source of the predicative stance on proper names, Tyler Burge’s 
‘Reference and Proper Names’ (Burge 1973). According to Burge, the determiner 
involved in the analysis of designative occurrences of proper names is a 
demonstrative ‘that’, as in ‘that individual named ‘Kennedy’’. Noteworthy in this 
respect is the fact that Burge not only refrains from any attack against the Direct 
Reference movement, but in fact explicitly endorses at least some of its distinctive 
tenets (Grice’s ‘Vacuous Names’, as far as I can tell, is the only source Burge 
indicates as incompatible with his approach to names; see Burge 1973: 428 fn. 4 and 
434 fn.13; 426 footnote 3).  
12 In particular, at least some descriptivist sources sympathetically mentioned by PT 
partisans take issue with Kripke-style arguments for rigidity, and propose ingenious 
examples apparently motivating a flaccid approach to proper names (Bach 2002, 
Geurts 1997). Uncontroversially, these examples need to be assessed in their own 
right, with no significant repercussions for the semantic implications of PT and MT. 
13 This is so, of course, even continuing to disregard the possibly indexical features 
introduced by tense in ‘(is an individual) named ‘Kennedy’’. 
14 A referee for this journal calls my attention to some points of contact between this 
strategy and the idea of a ‘switcher’ in Glüer and Pagin 2006. The analogies are 
intriguing, possibly modulo certain delicate issues having to do with the comparison 
of different semantic frameworks (Glüer and Pagin 2006 puts forth a model-theoretic 
approach grounded on the idea of an ‘actualist evaluation’ for individual constants, in 
turn applicable to the interpretation of occurrences of proper names within the scope 
of certain operators). 
15 The reiteration of a methodological caveat implicit in these considerations may be 
appropriate at this stage: if what follows is on the right track, my two-context 
proposal may be approached as a relatively natural formalization of certain prima 
facie plausible ideas. As a referee for this journal correctly points out, this much is not 
equivalent to the guarantee that my framework will be unproblematically 
generalizable and adaptable to larger fragments. This worry is legitimate, but puts a 
relatively heavy burden on my opponent’s shoulders: that of identifying inconsistent 
or otherwise intolerable consequences of what appears as a relatively minimal, though 
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admittedly non-trivial deviation from standard double-index approaches. 
16 Or, for that matter, ‘no less’: see in particular the discussion in Jeshion 2013c 
(including a ‘bat’ example attributed to Karen Lewis) and in Leckie 2013. Jeshion’s 
and Leckie’s examples weaken the case for MT, and indicate that the phenomena 
allegedly supporting MT are in fact derivable from regularities independent of the 
semantics of proper name. I leave these important considerations aside merely for 
methodological purposes, given the aim stated at the beginning of this essay: the 
discussion of the semantic consequences of PT and MT, granting (merely for the sake 
of argument) that these views are indeed properly motivated. 
17 I suppose the so-called ‘metasemantic’ theses often subsumed under the heading of 
the Causal (a.k.a. Historical) Theory of names may provide a fertile background for 
the development of a ‘theory of naming conventions’—see among many Evans 1973, 
Kripke 1980, and Devitt 1981. 
18 As usual, ignoring for simplicity’s sake issues of emptiness. 
19  The indexicalist take includes views which informally gloss ‘det’ as a 
demonstrative, as in Burge 1973, or which include among the elements of context 
some sort of ‘naming convention’ (as in Matushansky 2008: 592, citing Recanati 
1997 and Pelczar and Rainsbury 1998; for indexicalist views of names, see also 
Voltolini 1995). 
20  Regarding the Causal/Historical Theory of names and the related ideas of a 
‘baptism’ and a ‘dubbing’, see for instance Evans 1973, Kripke 1980, Devitt 1981, 
and Kaplan 1981. The Causal/Historical Theory is occasionally associated with 
distinctive metaphysical views about the individuation of words, and names in 
particular, as in Kaplan 1990. 
21 For a related distinction at the level of word-individuation, see Kaplan’s divide 
between ‘orthographic’ names and ‘common currency’ names, Kaplan 1990. 
22  For general comments pertaining to the distinction between pre-semantic and 
semantic roles of context, see in particular Perry 2001 and Predelli 2005. 
23 From a typographical point of view, this idea may be expressed in terms of a re-
interpretation of the artificial devices postulated by the ambiguity treatment of 
homonymy, according to which the occurrence of ‘Kennedy’ in ‘Kennedy1’ is of 
greater significance than, say, the occurrence of ‘cat’ in ‘catatonic’. Think, in other 
words, of the numerical appendix in ‘Kennedy1’ as a remnant of those elements of 
(formerly ‘pre-semantic’) context that do make a difference when it comes to 
character, as in <’Kennedy’, k1> and <’Kennedy’, k2>, the name/dubbing-context 
pairs. 
